In the US-American newspaper "Foreign Policy" presents the political scientist Gustavo de las Casas his concept of how Al-Qaeda fighting the best: when one keeps them alive!
The world would be as if it were Al-Qaida hold on life, paradoxically, for reasons of security. Man may like it or not, but keep a battered Al-Qaida intact is the best hope, may have the world to bring the Islamic fanatics in a single social network - where they track down the best track and the bridle can. The alternative would be to destroy the terrorist group, Al-Qaeda splinter into thousands of cells, and this would be much more difficult to track and impossible to eradicate. It is the dilemma of the counter-terrorism, and the only real choice is the most unpleasant: Al-Qaida has to live.
The group is driven by a high staff turnover, constantly under pressure to replace members who were lost due to successful operations against Western or successful suicide bombings. Al-Qaida on the middle level managers are critical to fill the personnel gap. These core members have more connections than their leadership or deposited the raw recruits, and form a bridge between the two groups. At the same time they are, by reason of their greater openness [exposure] easier to track. Herein lies the danger. Unfortunately, with the extinction of the middle layer of management, all hopes are extinguished to stop terrorist attacks.
Now, if the "middle management" the bridge between Leading figures such as Osama Bin Laden and new feeds is, then one would effectively weaken Al-Qaeda, by eliminating this middle management. Not when it comes to de las Casas. He claims the opposite:
It is tempting to record an organizational chart of al-.Qaida and think, if the important nodes could be identified and destroyed, that would then follow the rest of the network. But if Al Qaeda is turned off and middle management is depleted, then circling overzealous fanatics around the world no longer a central base. Your alternative? to start your own no-name network and other Al-Qaeda survivors close together. to kill Al-Qaida is little help to reduce Islamist terrorism. It would make the world of terrorism just chaotic.
The thesis that scattered and isolated terrorists are more dangerous than tightly organized, everything on its head, what is so far from the world of anti-terrorism Strategies knew. Officially, Al-Qaeda but could only carry out attacks like the September 11, because she was so tightly organized. Because dozens of fighters were able to coordinate conspiratorial. Because it is scattered around the world, but were still jointly operating cells, kept alive by international financial transfers were.
that what Al Qaeda is different but allegedly hundreds of other terrorist groups was, but after September 11, hammered all over the world claim that only Al-Qaeda was capable of such attacks. Now, if - contrary to the wish expressed in Foreign Policy - would be off the "middle management" and it would be that it act in the phenomenon of Al-Qaeda only to scattered Desperados, Al-Qaeda had lost to the alleged exclusivity. But it would be deprived of even the greatest fear mongers, be justified by the war and increasing surveillance in times of increased social tensions. Perhaps Al Qaeda will not lose this useful function for the ruling elite?
Delivered in Foreign Policy justification is not convincing in any case. There is reference to the case "Aryian Nations (AN), a racist, extreme right-wing organization in the United States. Founded in the 1970s, it was 1999, the FBI classified as a terror suspect. In 2000, then lost IN by a court order its headquarters in Hayden Lake. The fragmented TO thereupon into three groups. And this fragmentation makes it difficult to monitor. "With the loss of their land, they fall through the cracks," according to de las Caras. But the Argument is a catch: if until now in the public and legality of other groups working in increasingly conspiratorial acts and therefore provides security authorities with new challenges, this is something completely different when a group like Al-Qaeda, which is already in the illegality and supposedly have the capacity, from the clandestinity carry out attacks like the September 11 to can. This can be compared apples to oranges.
The alternative to the destruction of Al-Qaeda is to keep them weak - but alive. The West should refrain from attacking the central parts, and watch them instead and follow. Al-Qaida would continue to attract Islamist militants in its combined network, where the fight against terrorism, at least controllable [manageable] is.
Suppose the United States and its allies to learn over time about the network, Al-Qaida recruits could during their training and subsequent employment are shaded. New Al-Qaida agents may be neutralized as soon as they move away from the network. This timing avoids the distraction of the upper echelons of Al Qaeda, while still providing direct security threat is eliminated.
"Adopted" says in this respect from all. Suppose you learn about the time is not about Al-Qaeda to then prove the non-intervention almost as support. But even without addressing de las Casas proposal the U.S. and its allies should already have excellent knowledge of the inner workings Al-Qaeda, as I have already shown here, here , here and here .
, meanwhile, have Al-Qaeda's middle managers continue to live as an endangered species. That should not mean that they can do their job well. Attacks by Predator drones should focus on competent bosses, and spare their bumbling brothers. The former might make more careful and serious, but such attacks are selective Al-Qaeda to leave with an entrenched, ineffective middle section of leaders who lack in mind, perhaps to perform powerful operations.
The biggest lesson for the current counter-terrorism policy is perhaps that should be the hunt for Al-Qaeda's supreme leader, not an obsession [obsession]. In all likelihood, they are isolated vertices such that their prosecution is costly and only a limited Brings benefits. The fact is if the argument was holding, then Bin Laden is alive but dead useful Finally exert his speeches inflaming a certain attraction to potential Al-Qaeda recruits.
Interestingly, one of de las Casas thus Bin Laden is not competent to Al Qaeda bosses. I hereby d'accord, even with the claim that bin Laden is alive but dead useful'm asking However: useful for whom? The answer is likely de las Casas have a hard time. Finally, he himself seems to hardly be able to distinguish what Al-Qaida is using and what its opponents. Whether Bin Laden is why, as it were in a kind of dialectical brainwave for years been no verifiable sign of life has, because he assumes, like de las Casas that he is more useful than the United States alive dead? Or is that Bin Laden himself before his followers not credible in the long run, if he is not even able to provide proof of his vitality? He will be responsible for 9 / 11, but not even get to the chain? And how credible is to make anti-terrorism institutions when they call to each gray beard that appears somewhere in an "Al Qaeda" video, shouting 'Bin Laden'?
De las Casas thesis is found in some understanding, but not everywhere. One asks one on the side of the 'New York Times:
When is it the final blow against Al-Qaeda come at last? Al-Qaeda "may be added to the kiss of death when Islamic fundamentalism loses its momentum, for example, by an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement," writes de las Casas.
A long time off, no? (Source )
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